The Appellate Jurisprudence of
Justice Antonin Scalia
The appointment of Antonin Scalia to the United States Supreme Court in 1986, along with the elevation of Associate Justice
William Rehnquist to the position of Chief Justice, stirred extensive speculation about the extent to which these judges would
move the Court in a conservative direction. In order to anticipate
some of the changes that might take place on the Court, this comment analyzes a selection of Justice Scalia's opinions from his four
terms on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. These opinions, together with Justice Scalia's academic
writings, reveal recurring themes in his jurisprudence.1 A detailed
analysis of the new justice's appellate jurisprudence will serve as a
guidepost by which to predict his future performance on the Court,
as well as to measure his consistency as a jurist.
The comment examines Justice Scalia's opinions in three major areas: administrative law, statutory interpretation, and the first
amendment. Two considerations, one practical, the other thematic,
have contributed to this choice of coverage. As an appellate judge,
Justice Scalia wrote several opinions in these areas, while he wrote
relatively little on other issues likely to come before the Court. In
addition, a common thread runs through these subjects: Justice
Scalia's conception of the political process and his narrow view of
the courts' role in that process. This overarching theme is likely to
influence his views in areas beyond those discussed in this
comment.
Part I examines Justice Scalia's views on the institutional position of the judiciary in the area of administrative law. Most notably, Justice Scalia has used the doctrine of standing to limit the
class of persons who may challenge administrative actions. He has
also taken an expansive view of provisions in the Administrative
Procedure Act that shield the actions of administrative agencies
from judicial scrutiny.
Part II illuminates Justice Scalia's position on statutory interJustice Scalia's opinions for the Supreme Court are not discussed in this comment,
since he has not yet had time to develop a body of work large enough for meaningful

analysis.
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pretation, particularly his willingness to question some of the conventional tools for analyzing statutes. His opinions reflect scrupulous attention both to statutory language and to the nature of
bargains struck between various groups in Congress.
Finally, part III examines Justice Scalia's conception of the
first amendment. In this area, he has been reluctant to articulate
"new" constitutional rights or revise substantive constitutional
doctrines in light of changed social circumstances. Moreover, he
has accorded substantial weight to government regulatory interests-to the extent of reevaluating existing Supreme Court precedent-even when those interests conflict with freedom of private
expression.
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE JUDICIARY:
THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Article III, section 2 of the Constitution confines the federal
courts to adjudicating "cases" and "controversies." The Supreme
Court has relied on this language to support justiciability doctrines, such as standing, that require federal courts to step aside
while the political branches do their work, and thus limit the
power of "'an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in [a democratic] government.' ,,2However, this sort of deference conflicts
with other pressures created by modern government. Administrative regulation of the economy is a pervasive feature of the American political system. Yet, broad legislative grants of power to administrative bodies threaten uncontrolled discretion, as agencies
must resolve specific disputes based on amorphous or even contradictory legislative mandates. s To reduce the problem of discretion,
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) generally subjects agency
action to limited judicial review." The administrative law cases
that follow thus pit the structural concerns of judicial restraint
against the APA's oversight requirements.
A.

Standing: Proper Parties and Issues
The "cases and controversies" language of article III forecloses

2 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984), quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d
1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, concurring).
3 For general discussion, see Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation
of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1684 (1975).
4 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982): "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof."
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the conversion of the federal courts into "forums for the ventilation of public grievances" by requiring that legal questions be
'5
presented to federal courts only "in a concrete factual context.
As a result, Supreme Court standing doctrine has identified restrictions, both constitutional and prudential, on the parties who
may invoke judicial authority. At a minimum, a plaintiff must
show (1) that she personally has suffered some actual or
threatened injury from the defendent's conduct ("injury in fact"),
(2) that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action
("causation"), and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision ("redressability"). e Even when the plaintiff has
met these constitutional requirements, the Court has "refrained
from adjudicating 'abstract questions of wide public significance'
which amount to 'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and
'7
most appropriately addressed in the representative branches."
The Court has required that the plaintiff's complaint "fall within
'the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question.' "g
Standing limitations raise special difficulties in the administrative context. Until the late twentieth century, the law of standing was highly libertarian in character; judicial power "could be
invoked by those trying to fend off government activity, but not by
those trying to obtain government protection." But the Supreme
Court abandoned this narrow "legal interest" test in Data Processing Services v. Camp, holding that a wide variety of economic, aesthetic, or other interests could confer standing. 10 As a result, beneficiaries of regulation as well as private entities subject to
regulation could invoke judicial protection. "Faced with the seemingly intractable problem of agency discretion, courts have
changed the focus of judicial review. . . so that its dominant pura

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 473, 472 (1982).
Id. at 472. For an opinion by Justice Scalia exploring the "injury in fact" require-

ment, see United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378-81 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) ("chilling" effect of executive procedures for intelligence gathering on political

organizations insufficient to confer standing in absence of specific objective harm).
7

Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475, quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975).

1 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475, quoting Data Processing Services v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970).
9 Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein, and Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Law 87 (1986) ("Stone Casebook").

'0 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (seller of data processing services had standing to challenge

administrative ruling that national banks could sell such services to other banks and bank
customers). Even under Data Processing,however, a purely ideological interest in bringing

about compliance with the law is insufficient to confer standing. See Stone Casebook at 87
(cited in note 9).
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pose is no longer the prevention of unauthorized intrusions on private autonomy, but the assurance of fair representation for all affected interests."1 1
As reflected in his writing both on and off the bench, Justice
Scalia remains highly skeptical of these modern developments. In
two related cases,12 for example, Justice Scalia dissented from the
D.C. Circuit majority's holdings that consumer organizations had
standing to challenge National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) actions reducing 1985 and 1986 fuel economy standards for light trucks' 3 and delaying promulgation of 1987 stanreduced
dards.14 The injury asserted in both cases consisted of
5
consumer ability to purchase fuel-efficient light trucks.'
In order to link NHTSA's actions with the asserted injury, the
majority looked to the policy that inspired the fuel standards. Because such rules existed "for the purpose of making vehicles more
fuel-efficient," and because the plaintiffs complained of less fuelefficient vehicles, the majority had no difficulty concluding that
plaintiffs had met the requirement of causation. As to redressability, the court reasoned that "[i]f setting a higher standard
cannot result in vehicles with increased fuel efficiency, then the entire regulatory scheme is pointless."' 6
In dissent, Justice Scalia scrutinized each link in the "chain of
hypotheses and predictions" connecting NHTSA's actions with reduced consumer choice. 17 He observed that the plaintiffs could not
identify a single fuel-efficient truck or fuel-saving option made unavailable by NHTSA's action; the plaintiffs' own studies showed
that manufacturers often chose to pay noncompliance penalties
rather than take drastic measures to comply with more stringent
standards. He concluded that where the plaintiffs had not "suffered the personal hurt that alone justifies judicial interference
" Stewart, 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 1712 (cited in note 3); Stone Casebook at 87 (cited in
note 9).
2 Center for Auto Safety v. N.H.T.S.A., 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Auto Safety
I"); In re Center for Auto Safety, 793 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Auto Safety I").
" For example, NHTSA reduced the 1985 standard of 21 miles per gallon to 19.5 miles
per gallon. Auto Safety I, 793 F.2d at 1323.
14 Auto Safety II, 793 F.2d at 1347-48. For a summary of the regulatory framework, see
Auto Safety I, 793 F.2d at 1324-28.
Auto Safety I, 793 F.2d at 1324; Auto Safety II, 793 F.2d at 1350.
16 Auto Safety I, 793 F.2d at 1334-35.
17 For example, Justice Scalia questioned whether reduced standards for the current
year would necessarily result "in increased sales of fuel-inefficient light trucks and decreased

sales of fuel-efficient light trucks" and whether a delay in promulgation of rules for future
years would necessarily preclude imposition of the "maximum feasible" fuel economy standards in those years. Id. at 1343.
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with the execution of the laws" but merely sought to secure a contemplated benefit "to the society at large," a court should defer to
"the political mechanisms by which that society acts."' 18
Deference to the representative process may be an attractive
solution in fuel standard cases. First, there is little reason to suspect that the representative scheme would place any of the relevant interests at a systematic disadvantage. Diffuse consumer interests are represented by an organized lobby; historically, auto
manufacturers have influenced legislation affecting them. Second,
at least one of the forms of relief requested-retroactive establishment of fuel standards' 9 -raises troubling implications for the judiciary. While a court may review agency rules to ensure that they
are not "arbitrary or capricious, '2 0 actual rulemaking by a
court-at least where it goes beyond ordering the reinstatement of
regulations that the agency wrongly abandoned-appears inconsistent with the separation of policymaking and judicial functions.
While Justice Scalia's approach would secure these institutional advantages, it also undercuts the reasons for abandonment
of the legal interest test. The most powerful of those rationales was
the desire to give full effect to Congress's intent by ensuring that
statutes actually protect those they were meant to benefit. A secondary purpose was to enhance judicial oversight of agency
discretion.
Justice Scalia's strict enforcement of the causation and redressability requirements reduces both protection of regulatory beneficiaries and oversight of agency action. The D.C. Circuit majority
had been content to imply causation and redressability from regulatory purposes: because the higher standards apparently were intended to increase fuel efficiency, the majority concluded that the
standards would produce that result. Justice Scalia's dissent, on
the other hand, demonstrated how marginal increases in fuel standards might fail to increase fuel efficiency because of the regulals Id. at 1343, 1344, 1345. In another case, Justice Scalia argued that separation of powers considerations could outweigh redress for even an undisputed "personal hurt"-a seizure
of private property-where a judicial remedy would interfere with functions, such as foreign
affairs, exclusively consigned to another branch. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745
F.2d 1500, 1550-66 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (dissent).
" Auto Safety I, 793 F.2d at 1344-45 (Scalia, dissenting).
20 This is the normal standard of review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). For two examples of its application by Justice Scalia, see Center
for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (upholding NHTSA's reduction of
automobile bumper standards); KCST-TV, Inc. v. F.C.C., 699 F.2d 1185, 1195-1201 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (dissent) (arguing against application of "hard look" doctrine to FCC's denial of
local TV affiliate's petition for waiver of exception to network nonduplication rules).
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tory loopholes available to manufacturers. For Justice Scalia, these
loopholes severed the causal connection between NHTSA's actions
and the plaintiffs' injury, thereby foreclosing federal judicial
review.
One might argue-following the increasingly influential model
of regulation as a bargain between beneficiaries, regulators, and
regulated entities 21-that Justice Scalia's approach merely gives
appropriate weight to the lenient provisions that manufacturers
succeeded in securing from NHTSA. The implication of such a
model, however, is that regulated interests can use such provisions
not only to temper the effects of regulation, but also to insulate
themselves from judicial oversight of agency efforts to enforce any
remaining regulations in the statute.
Finally, a grant of standing to challenge agency action may not
require a choice between the judicial and political processes in the
long run. The court may uphold the administrative action on the
merits; if not, an administrative law decision, unlike a constitutionally based one, still does not foreclose legislative action in the future. Even if Congress later overrides the court's decision, judicial
intervention may have been a "necessary stimulant" to effective
legislative oversight.2 2 In this sense, the exercise of judicial power
could enhance rather than usurp democratic control of agency
discretion.
Justice Scalia's separate opinion in Community Nutrition Institute v. Block 23 sheds more light on his view of the representative
process and its preeminence over judicial control of agency action.
In that case, individual consumers, a consumer organization, and a
handler of milk products challenged Department of Agriculture
market orders that assured producers uniform prices for raw
milk.24 The plaintiffs alleged that the price orders deprived them
of a lower-priced substitute for whole milk. The main point of contention between the majority and Justice Scalia was the "prudential" standing requirement that individual consumers fall within
the zone of interests protected by the statute. The majority held
that the consumers met this requirement because the relevant statute expressed a general congressional policy to protect consumers

21

See. e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. 335

(1974).
11 See Stewart, 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 1742 (cited in note 3).
23 698 F.2d 1239, 1255-59 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2, Id. at 1242-43. The milk price orders permitted local pooling arrangements and restricted alternative sellers of powdered milk products.
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from excessive price increases.25
Justice Scalia argued that the relevant standing inquiry was
whether Congress intended to enable consumers to challenge
agency action in the federal courts. "Governmental mischief whose
effects are widely distributed is more readily remedied through the
political process, and does not call into play the distinctive function of the courts as guardians against oppression of the few by the
many." In Community Nutrition there was "a direct and immediate beneficiary class"-milk producers and handlers-that could
be relied upon to challenge agency misconduct, thus weakening the
claim of "indirect general beneficiaries"-consumers of milk-to
be designated "private attorneys general. '26 The nature of the legislation in question-an interest group bargain devised to insulate
milk producers from competitive forces, according to Justice
Scalia-informed the breadth of the statute's zone of interests.
Under this view, a court should restrict actions by parties outside
of the legislative bargain. 7
On review, the Supreme Court unanimously sided with Justice
Scalia in denying an action to individual consumers. 8 Rather than
distinguish between direct and indirect beneficiaries, Justice
O'Connor's opinion emphasized specific statutory provisions calling
for cooperation among the secretary of agriculture, producers, and
handlers to raise prices-a process excluding direct consumer participation. Because the essential purpose of the regulatory scheme
was to raise milk prices and thus secure the economic well-being of
dairy farmers, consumers could hardly be deemed beneficiaries at
all. 2 9

This approach has drawbacks, however. For one, where Congress has attempted to disguise a pure interest group deal with
generalized references to consumer interests, it may be desirable
for courts to permit outsiders to challenge the terms of the bargain. A conception of standing that gives full effect to publicminded utterances in statutes could deter the creation of narrow
interest group legislation, or at least force Congress to set forth the
interest group character of legislation explicitly if it wishes to prevent external attacks.3 0
"'

Id. at 1246-47, 1249.

24 Id. at 1256, 1257.

For a similar understanding of the milk price regulations in this case, see Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 49-51 (1984).
28 Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
19 Id. at 347, 342.
'o See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum L. Rev. 223, 238-39, 251-52 (1986).
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Secondly, Justice Scalia's approach in Community Nutrition
may insulate agencies too effectively, a tendency also evident in
the fuel standards cases. Within the regulatory framework described by Justice O'Connor, the secretary of agriculture is the
only participant who can restrain demands for higher prices and
thus safeguard consumer interests. Agency capture is a substantial
risk where an agency distributes benefits to a narrow economic
class: a denial of standing to outsiders simply ignores this problem. 31 Where courts deny standing to a group seeking to combat
the problem of capture, the courts run the risk of squeezing that
group out of the political system altogether.
Justice Scalia's academic writings further illuminate his conception of the institutional relationship between courts and agencies.32 In a 1983 article discussing standing and the separation of
powers, he observed that "the law of standing roughly restricts
courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against the impositions of the majority, and
excludes them from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches should function in order to serve
the interest of the majority itself.""3 Viewed in this manner, the
consumer actions in Center for Auto Safety and Community Nutrition represented attempts to vindicate majoritarian interests in
fuel-efficient trucks and lower milk prices. Commenting on this
type of case, Justice Scalia reasoned that "[u]nless the plaintiff can
show some respect in which he is harmed more than the rest of us
11On

the relationship between standing and agency capture, see Stewart, 88 Harv. L.

Rev. at 1728 (cited in note 3) ("[E]xtension of standing to an increased range of affected
interests is a judicial reaction to the agencies' perceived failure to represent such interests
fairly, and the consequent perceived need for court review to correct the dereliction."); Cass
R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 74-75 (1985)
("judicial review at the behest of beneficiaries, no less than review at the behest of members
of the regulated class" may guard against agency capture and "increase the likelihood of
agency fidelity to statutory standards"). As Professor Sunstein notes, distrust of narrow factional interests has substantial roots in American political thought. Id. at 38-48.
32 For examples, see Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and
the Supreme Court, 1978 S.Ct. Rev. 345; Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco-A Reprise, 47 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 57 (1979); Antonin Scalia, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety
Act and Frank Goodman, 20 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 899 (1973); Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from
the Public-Lands Cases, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 867 (1970).
3 Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation
of Powers, 17 Suffolk L. Rev. 881, 894 (1983) (original emphasis).
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. . . he has not established any basis for concern that the majority
is suppressing or ignoring the rights of a minority." Under such
conditions, he could find "no reason to believe that an alleged governmental default of such general impact would not receive fair
34
consideration in the normal political process.
As Community Nutrition illustrates, however, the political
process may not always produce an appropriate evaluation of majority and minority interests. Modern theories of pluralism reveal
the potential for a well-organized faction to secure its own selfinterested ends at the expense of broader interests. 5 An argument
from political process loses considerable force in light of the collective action problems that typically plague diffuse, unorganized majorities.36 One can hardly believe that Justice Scalia is unaware of
these pitfalls.3 7 Rather, his willingness to use standing requirements to safeguard legislative bargains from external attack embodies acceptance of the Holmesian insight that the "normal" political process consists of an unprincipled, even destructive, power
struggle among competing pressure groups. 8 As Hamilton noted,
courts possess "neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment";39
the effective exercise of judicial power ultimately turns on consent,
by agencies of government as well as by the public, to the principled determinations of judges insulated from popular pressures. 0

34

Id. at 894-95 (original emphasis), 896.

5 Two seminal works on pluralist theory are Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic

Theory (1963); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. 3 (1971).
36 See generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1965). For an attack on
theories that limit judicial review to protection of minority interests underrepresented in
the political process, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products,98 Harv. L. Rev.
713 (1985).
37 For an example of Justice Scalia's work that seems to ignore these difficulties, see 17
Suffolk L. Rev. at 895-96 (cited in note 33), which flatly asserts that the majority's interest
in clean air will receive "fair consideration" in the political process.
3 What proximate test of excellence [in a political system] can be found except correspondence to the actual equilibrium of force in the community-that is, conformity to
the wishes of the dominant power. Of course, such conformity may lead to destruction,
and it is desirable that the dominant power be wise. But wise or not, the proximate test
of good government is that the dominant power has its way.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: His Book Notices and Uncollected Letters and Papers 250
(1936). This view counsels substantial deference by judges to political outcomes. Holmes
once wrote: "If my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job." 1
Holmes-Laski Letters 249 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1953). For a summary of the Holmesian
understanding, see Stone Casebook at 738-39 (cited in note 9).
39 The Federalist Papers No. 78 at 465 (New Amer. Lib. ed. 1961) (emphasis in
original).
10 On the importance of principle in the exercise of judicial review, as well as the difficulties its pursuit may cause the courts, see Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 23-28, 111-98 (2d ed. 1986).
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Thus, where disputes over the direction of public policy do not implicate agreed-upon principles for the protection of a minority but
are merely questions of power, an unelected judiciary has no claim
to control the outcome.
At bottom, preservation of legislative bargains relates to the
legitimacy of judicial power. If judges embroil themselves in power
struggles among interest groups, they run the risk of undermining
public esteem for the courts by contributing to a perception that
the judges' own policy views, rather than neutral principles, guide
judicial review.
But judicial deference on this ground also presents a different
threat to judicial legitimacy. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, standing requirements are largely "judicially self-imposed
limits."' 41 Even Alexander Bickel, a fervent advocate of both principled decision making and judicial self-restraint, conceded that
such "devices for staying the Court's hand . . . cannot themselves
be principled in the sense in which we have a right to expect adjudications on the merits to be principled." It is at the point where a
court "gives the electoral institutions their head and itself stays
4
out of politics" that the court "is most a political animal.
Justice Scalia's restrictive standing doctrine raises a similar
danger: his strategy may create a perception that judicial deference
stems from a particular, and possibly idiosyncratic, view of representative government rather than from the application of agreedupon principles. 43 Though expressed in terms evoking the separation of powers, Justice Scalia's views on standing amount to revival
of the pre-DataProcessingunderstanding of the judicial role: that,
for the most part, courts should intervene only to safeguard regulated entities (minorities) from illegitimate regulation rather than
to protect the ostensible beneficiaries of regulation (majorities)
from agency dereliction. Such a regime creates pressure in one direction: administrators have little to fear from a court if they fail
to regulate, but risk judicial intervention should they choose to impose sanctions. In this respect, Justice Scalia's jurisprudence is
fundamentally laissez-faire and antiregulation; it is also contrary to
legislative will in cases where Congress has evinced a desire to use
Wright, 468 U.S. at 751.
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 132, 132 (cited in note 40).
43 See generally Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1964) (criticizing Professor Bickel's "passive virtues" as themselves undermining the Court's function of
enunciating principle).
41
42
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regulation to protect the public.
A pre-Data Processing approach to standing would strongly
encourage Congress itself to state clearly that beneficiaries may obtain regulatory action through the courts. In his article on standing, Justice Scalia at least admitted that he would permit actions
by beneficiaries when authorized by particular regulatory statutes.44 This aspect of Justice Scalia's standing jurisprudence can
hardly fail to find support in the Supreme Court. A conception of
standing in administrative law cases rooted in specific statutory directives would demand the kind of close examination of statutes
undertaken by the unanimous Court in Community Nutrition.
In practice, however, reliance on legislative grants of standing
would insulate agencies from attack in precisely those situations
where external monitoring is most needed: where the targets of
regulation form a highly concentrated, organized interest group
and the beneficiaries a diffuse and politically weak class. Justice
Scalia-accepting the outcomes of political power battles as legitimate despite distortions in the representative process-would
probably respond: so be it.
B.

Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act

While the cases on standing define who may obtain judicial
review of agency action, a second group of cases establishes the
types of agency behavior that may be reviewed. Under the APA,
final agency action is subject to judicial review. 45 However, the general review clause does not apply where "(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion
by law."'4 ' Disputes over the scope of these two exceptions once
again involve a conflict between the value of judicial oversight and
concerns about judicial policymaking.
Gott v. Walters47 involved the first of the APA's two excep44 Under the judicial review provision of the APA, "any person suffering legal wrong
because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702. According to Justice Scalia, the second clause of this provision incorporates the liberalized standing
provisions of specific statutes, although it does not, contrary to Data Processing, affirmatively grant standing in all situations where the plaintiff's interests are affected by regulation. 17 Suffolk L. Rev. at 887-89 (cited in note 33). For Data Processing'streatment of this
provision of the APA, see 397 U.S. at 153 (holding that plaintiffs merely must be within the
"zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute.., in question").
45 5 U.S.C. § 701.
"I Id. at § 701 (a)(1),(2).

47 756 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 791 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1986)

(en banc).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[54:705

tions to judicial review. There, the plaintiffs challenged certain injury methodologies used by the Veterans Administration on the
ground that the agency had failed to follow the notice and comment procedures outlined in the APA. The veterans' benefits statute stipulated that VA decisions "on any question of law or fact
under any law administered by the Veterans' Administation pro'48
viding benefits for veterans . . . shall be final and conclusive.
Under the VA's interpretation, its contested injury methodologies were unreviewable because they related to the benefit scheme
administered by the VA and thus "arose under" the veterans' benefit statute. The plaintiffs, however, maintained that their challenge was permissible because it derived from the APA, not veterans' benefits laws.4 9 In upholding the VA's interpretation, Justice
Scalia's majority opinion relied primarily on pragmatic considerations, although it found further support in legislative history. He
reasoned that judicial review would create the prospect of judicial
interference with "millions" of agency decisions by opening individual claim determinations to review for compliance with APA
procedures, a result that would undermine the purpose of the statutory provision precluding review.5 0 In the face of statutory ambiguity, Justice Scalia thus selected a reading that would limit judicial interference with agency affairs.
Some of Gott's language particularly reflects Justice Scalia's
concerns about the judiciary's role in the modern administrative
state. Justice Scalia emphasized the legislature's rejection of the
"judicialization, and even the lawyerization" of veterans' benefits
and quoted a commentator's assessment that the VA system had
"managed to maintain an acceptable level of satisfaction with its
process without significant use of oral hearings, without employing
independent ALJs, and without subjecting its judgments to judicial review." 51 This aspect of Gott is dictum; but it reflects a belief
that courts should not readily impose legalistic structures on the

48

38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982), quoted in Gott, 756 F.2d at 906.

19 See Gott, 756 F.2d at 905-10 (rejecting the plaintiffs' argument), 919-20 & n.3 (Wald,
dissenting) (adopting it).
50 Id. at 909.
51 Id. at 916, quoting Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice 142 (1983). Using the Social Security Administration as his primary example, Professor Mashaw "squarely reject[ed]
the traditional American reliance on formal proceedings and judicial review to control administration." Lance Liebman and Richard B. Stewart, Book Review: Bureaucratic Vision,
96 Harv. L. Rev. 1952, 1954 (1983). In passing, Professor Mashaw cited the VA as an example in support of this thesis. See Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice at 142. For a contrary view
of the VA's operation, see National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F.Supp.
1302, 1315-23 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (describing VA processing of veterans' disability claims).
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administrative process.
International Union, United Auto., Aerospace v. Donovan5 2
involved the APA's second exception to judicial review of agency
action: action "committed to agency discretion by law." The Supreme Court has held that an action is so committed "where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no
law to apply.' " In International Union, the plaintiff unions had
challenged the secretary of labor's decision not to allocate any of
the agency's appropriations to a job training program, although
such a program was included among the permissible uses of the
funds.5 4 Justice Scalia's opinion for the panel held that the court of
appeals lacked jurisdiction over the secretary of labor's allocation
of a lump-sum budgetary appropriation from Congress.
Where Congress had delegated allocative discretion to an
agency, Justice Scalia was not prepared to infer a requirement of
"reasonable distribution." He supported this result by arguing that
the judiciary was not competent to distribute public funds among
competing social programs. The process of budgetary allocation
was "an archetypically political task, involving the application of
value judgments and predictions to innumerable alternatives, as
opposed to the application of accepted principles to a binary determination." 55 For Justice Scalia, the budgetary process represented
precisely the type of unprincipled pork-barrel conflict that he had
counseled against disturbing in the standing cases.
In an earlier article opposing the legislative veto,56 Justice
Scalia lamented Congress's tendency to delegate to administrative
agencies "tasks requiring judgments that are of an essentially political nature and that ought to be made by our elected representatives. ' 57 Budgetary allocation would fit this description. With re-

746 F.2d 855 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971), quoting
Sen. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945).
Intern. Union, 746 F.2d at 856.
" Id. at 862-63.
Antonin Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload, 3 Regu"

lation 19 (Nov.-Dec. 1979) (describing the legislative veto as "the device whereby executive
[agency] action authorized by statute is made subject to prior disapproval by one (the so-

called one-house veto) or both (the two-house veto) houses of Congress"). The "distinctive
feature" of the legislative veto is that it enables Congress to stay or revoke previously au-

thorized executive action while "avoiding the President's veto power and (in the case of the
one-house veto) the requirement of approval by both houses." Id. Since that article, the
Supreme Court's decision in I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), striking down a one-

house veto on separation of powers grounds, largely has settled the debate in Justice Scalia's
favor.

. Scalia, 3 Regulation at 26 (cited in note 56).
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spect to many of these political judgments, he pointed out that
"Congress would not wish to monitor even if it could do so," since
it had "delegated in the first place simply because [such matters]
were 'too hot to handle.' "" This observation, however, undercuts
Justice Scalia's own use of standing limitations, discussed earlier,
to reserve some issues for representative bodies. Where the original
delegation is evidence of the legislature's unwillingness to grapple
with "hot" political issues directly, there may be little reason to
suspect that the legislators will adequately monitor agency discretion when such issues are thrown back to them by the courts.
A second case in which Justice Scalia interpreted the "committed to agency discretion" exception required a more fundamental reassessment of the relationship between courts and agencies.
9 eight death row inmates asserted
In Chaney v. Heckler,5
that
state executioners' use of certain drugs to administer capital punishment, without prior approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), violated provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act designed to ensure the safety and effectiveness of new uses for
existing drugs.60
The D.C. Circuit panel majority upheld the plaintiffs' claim. It
held that, among other things, the FDA's refusal to exercise its enforcement power did not fall within the APA's "agency discretion"
exception to judicial review. Rather, the majority concluded, there
was "law to apply" in the case: an FDA policy statement had stipulated that when unapproved use of a regulated drug endangered
the public health, the FDA was "obligated" to act." Justice Scalia
vigorously dissented. On review, the Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Justice Rehnquist, agreed with Justice Scalia and reversed the
panel's decision, holding that the agency's action was an unreviewable exercise of discretion.
The essential difference between the approaches of Justice
Scalia and the panel's majority lay in characterization of the case.
For the majority, Chaney involved a clash between individual
rights and government power, one that pitted a "glib statement of
reasons for the agency's inaction" against the risk to the inmates of
"cruel, protracted death" from the inappropriate use of regulated
58Id.

at 24 (original emphasis).
59 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983), reversed by Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
10 Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1176-77. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1982).
61718 F.2d at 1186, quoting Policy Statement, Legal Status of Approved Labeling for
Prescription Drugs, 37 Fed. Reg. 16503, 16504 (1972).
The majority also held that the FDA had jurisdiction to interfere with state capital

punishment procedures employing the drugs. Justice Scalia dissented on this point as well.
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drugs.6 2 For Justice Scalia and Justice Rehnquist, by contrast,
Chaney represented a clash of institutions: an attempt to secure
judicial interference with an executive agency's expert judgment
63
concerning the deployment of its limited enforcement resources.
Framing the issue as an institutional conflict led both Justice
Scalia and Justice Rehnquist to infer a general presumption
against judicial review of agency inaction." Yet the distinction
they drew between action (presumptively reviewable) and inaction
(presumptively unreviewable) appears tenuous in light of the express terms of the APA. That statute defines agency action to include a "failure to act" and empowers the courts to "compel
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. '6 5 Justice Scalia's willingness to infer a broad presumption against judicial review in the face of this statutory language indicates how
strongly he emphasizes the separation of powers.
Justice Scalia's line between agency action (the marshaling of
government power against the individual) and inaction (a refusal
to confer a benefit on an individual)6 6 is consistent with his conception of a countermajoritarian role for the courts. Justice Scalia
converted Chaney from an attractive case for judicial action in
which plaintiffs sought judicial protection as a political minority
(inmates facing capital punishment) to a far less attractive case in
which the plaintiffs sought a public benefit (FDA enforcement of

42

63

Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1191.
Id. at 1192-95 (Scalia, dissenting).

Id. at 1198 (Scalia, dissenting); 470 U.S. at 838. Justice Scalia and Justice Rehnquist
used similar arguments to support this proposition. Both opinions maintained: (1) that enforcement decisions implicated agency expertise, see 718 F.2d at 1192-93, 470 U.S. at 831-32;
and (2) that enforcement priorities came within the executive branch's constitutional authority to "take care" that the laws be faithfully executed, U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. See 718
F.2d at 1192, 470 U.S. at 832. Justice Rehnquist added that agency inaction generally does
not involve the "exercise of coercive power over an individual's liberty or property rights,
and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect." 470 U.S.

at 832 (original emphasis). For criticism of these arguments, see Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653, 665-75 (1985). For

general background, see Comment, The Impact of Heckler v. Chaney on Judicial Review of
Agency Decisions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1247 (1986).

Although the Court was unanimous as to the result in Chaney, Justice Marshall disagreed with the general presumption of unreviewability, 470 U.S. at 840-55 (concurring),

and Justice Brennan believed that the opinion left open the possibility of judicial review of
a wide range of agency inaction, id. at 839 (concurring).
"
5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 706(1) (1982).
"

For discussion of this distinction in the constitutional context, see David P. Currie,

Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 864 (1986); Seth F. Kreimer,

Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1293 (1984).
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public health statutes). In choosing this perspective, Justice Scalia
looked beyond the particular parties before the court to the larger
political context underlying governmental decisions. Although such
a perspective is ostensibly a means to protect the separation of
powers, it tends to taint judicial treatment of a particular "case"
with the broader policy outlook more typical of legislative
decisions.
Taken as a whole, these cases strongly suggest that Justice
Scalia tends to value institutional concerns such as separation of
powers more than the competing interest of judicial oversight. In
particular, the new justice perceives a sharp distinction between
agency action and inaction and between judicial protection of regulated interests and of regulatory beneficiaries. The major flaw in
this approach lies in its failure to acknowledge evidence that the
representative process has only limited capacity to safeguard the
diffuse majoritarian interests that regulation purportedly serves.
II.

A.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

The Canons of Statutory Construction

The canons occupy a central place among the tools available
to a judge in applying a statute. Defenders of these devices contend that they serve as agreed-upon rules for deciphering statutes,
represent commonsense guides to interpretation, constrain judicial
interpretation, and limit the delegation of legislative power to
courts.6 7 Critics have assailed the canons as indeterminate, 8 and
even "just plain wrong"-that is, contrary to any realistic conception of legislative behavior.6 "
Justice Scalia likewise has been suspicious of several canons.
For example, in Carter v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs,7 0 his opinion for the panel declared that the canon
"inclusio unius est exclusio alterius '71 has force "only when there
is no apparent reason for the inclusion of one disposition and the
6 For a concise but critical review of these arguments, see Richard A. Posner, Statutory Intepretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 805-07
(1983).

as See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are To be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401-06 (1950)
(for every canon there exists an opposite canon).
69 Posner, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 806 (cited in note 67). Judge Posner has argued, for
example, that the canons frequently and unrealistically assume legislative omniscience with

respect to the details of previously enacted statutes. Id. at 811-14.
70 751 F.2d 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
7 "The inclusion of one thing implies

the exclusion of alternate things."
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omission of a parallel disposition except the desire to achieve disparate results. '72 Carter involved provisions of the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (LHWCA) permitting employers and their insurers to offset compensation payments
by the amount that an injured worker recovered from a third-party
tortfeasor.1 3 The plaintiff worker argued that the provision's failure to mention the federal government implied that the defendant
agency could not offset his benefits.
In rejecting the plaintiff's contention, Justice Scalia relied on
the particular background of LHWCA, which he said demonstrated the legislature's support for "further judical elaboration"
according to "traditional equitable principles" to prevent double
recovery by workers.7 4 This approval of judicial gap filling initially
appears anomalous in light of the justice's strict guardianship of
the separation of powers. But Carter indicates flexibility in his
views; the decision approves supplementation of statutes where the
underlying legislation represents a delegation of authority to the
common law process and where recognized principles (for example,
equitable doctrines) serve to limit judicial innovation.
In a second case involving the canons, United States v. Hansen,7 5 Justice Scalia criticized one canon while applying another.
The case involved a prosecution of Representative George Hansen
for failing to disclose certain income pursuant to the Ethics in
Government Act (EIGA).7 ' Hansen's conviction rested not on the
civil penalty clause of EIGA itself, but on a general federal statute
imposing criminal sanctions on persons willfully making false
77
statements to a department or agency.
Citing the rule of lenity, which provides that ambiguity in a
criminal statute should be resolved in the defendant's favor, Hansen contended that the uncertainty concerning the preemptive effect of EIGA on the existing criminal statute meant he should not
be subject to the criminal sanctions. Justice Scalia responded, however, that the Supreme Court had previously rejected the rule of
lenity in cases involving the criminal statute in question. 78 Although this argument alone could have been dispositive, Justice

72 Carter, 751 F.2d at 1401.
73 33 U.S.C. § 933(f), (h) (1982).
74 Carter, 751 F.2d at 1402.
75 772 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
76 EIGA, Title I, 2 U.S.C. §§ 701-09 (1982) (setting forth the reporting requirements).
7 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
78 Hansen, 772 F.2d at 948-49, citing United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 70 n.7
(1984), and United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475 (1984).
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on to note that the rule "provides little more than atmospherics, since it leaves open the crucial question . . . of how
much ambiguousness constitutes an ambiguity." 7 In other words,
application of such an open-ended rule for statutory explication,
unlike the gap filling in Carter, would expand judicial discretion
without a congressional mandate to do so.
While he rejected the rule of lenity, Justice Scalia applied the
canon disfavoring repeals of previous laws by implication. Without
that canon, he wrote, "the legislative process would become distorted by a sort of blind gamesmanship, in which Members of Congress [would] vote for or against a particular measure according to
their varying estimations of whether it will be held to suspend the
effects of an earlier law that they favor or oppose." 80 The implications of this argument are twofold. First, it is consistent with Justice Scalia's preference for explicitness in legislation: application of
the canon compels Congress expressly to reconsider existing law,
without the subterfuge of implicit repeal. To this extent, the canon
can help preserve the original legislative bargain from collateral attack. Second, the canon may facilitate lawmaking by eliminating
one potential ground of dispute between opponents and proponents of a bill. When the presumptive effect of new laws on existing statutes is known, legislators can use their time to resolve
substantive disagreements concerning the new proposal.8 1
B.

Legislative History and the Politics of Lawmaking

Hansen raises a second problem of gap filling: what evidence
should a judge employ to justify a particular statutory reading by
reference to the intentions of the enacting legislature? To pin
down the nebulous concept of "legislative intent," the federal
courts traditionally have turned to congressional committee reports.2 A footnote to the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Hirschey v.
F.E.R.C.,8a for example, referred to a statement in a committee report that the 1985 amendments to the Equal Access to Justice Act
79

772 F.2d at 948.

80 Id. at 944.
81 Of course, it might be argued that Justice Scalia's approach also would limit resort

to ambiguous language where that is the only way to reach a compromise. This would tend
to reduce Congress's ability to enact new legislation, another result with which Justice
Scalia might not be wholly displeased.
82 See Horace E. Read, John W. MacDonald, Jefferson B. Fordham, and William J.
Pierce, Materials on Legislation 906-41 (4th ed. 1982); Frank E. Horack Jr., ed., 2 Suther-

land on Statutes and Statutory Construction §§ 5005-07 (3d ed. 1943).
83

777 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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(EAJA) "ratified" an earlier D.C. Circuit decision concerning the
granting of attorney's fees under EAJA.8 4 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia used this fleeting reference to launch a broad
attack on conventional deference to such evidence.
Specifically, Justice Scalia rejected the assumption that "the
details, as opposed to the broad outlines of purpose, set forth in a
committee report come to the attention of" the enacting legislature. 5 In part, this objection reflects the fear that deference to
every minutiae of a committee report would "convert[] a system of
judicial construction into a system of committee-staff prescription."8 Justice Scalia's concern stems from his aversion to devices
that mask the underlying choices made by the judge in construing
a statute and that may even serve to confer a false impression that
elected representatives actually considered and intended the result
87
reached by the judge.
An even more problematic source of evidence concerning "legislative intent" consists of "subsequent legislative history," that is,
legislators' remarks on the meaning of a previously enacted statute. Justice Scalia's views on this type of evidence are clearly
presented in Gott v. Walters, discussed in part I, which construed
a statute governing the availability of judicial review of VA decisions. In dissent, Judge Wald argued for review power, relying in
part on legislators' statements made during debate over a subsequent veterans' benefits law. In that context, the proponent of the
later law had observed that previous legislation-namely, the statute at issue in Gott-had already granted judicial review.8 Justice
Scalia responded for the majority, however, that reliance on such
after-the-fact remarks would allow advocates of judicial review to
"achieve the result they were unable to obtain [earlier] through the
legislative process."89
" Id. at 2 n.9. Far from relying on the committee report, the majority expressly stated
that such evidence was "irrelevant" to its determination.
'6 Id. at 7 (concurrence). Justice Scalia also cited an excerpt from the Congressional
Record in which a committee chairman admitted that he had not written or read the committee's report and that the committee itself had never voted on the report. 777 F.2d at 7
n.1.
88 Id. at 8. In Hirschey, the statements in the committee report were particularly suspect because they dealt with a portion of the statute that the 1985 Congress had reenacted
unchanged, despite a contemporary circuit split over its meaning. If Congress had considered and resolved the problem in favor of the D.C. Circuit's position, one would expect it
would have made this clear when it reenacted the statute. See id.
87 See Posner, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 816-17 (cited in note 67) (criticizing the canons on
similar grounds).
88 Gott, 756 F.2d at 926-27.
89 Id. at 914. Justice Scalia supported the denial of jurisdiction over veterans' benefits
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A similar concern for protection of the original legislative bargain informed Justice Scalia's dissent in Illinois Commerce Com'n
v. I.C.C. 90 There, a state regulatory agency challenged the ICC's
decision to preempt regulation of intrastate railroad rates under
the Staggers Rail Act of 1980,"' legislation that empowered the
ICC to exempt railroads from regulation under specified circumstances. 2 The panel majority upheld the ICC's conclusion that a
federal exemption order constituted a "standard and procedure" to
93
which the state must defer under the statute.
Siding with the state agency, Justice Scalia recharacterized the
regulatory context by reference to the political forces underlying
the Staggers Rail Act. For Justice Scalia, the language of the Act
embodied "a compromise between pro- and anti-preemption legislators," and it would be a "betrayal of that compromise" for a
court subsequently to accord victory to the pro-preemption
forces."4
Justice Scalia's attention to the dual nature of the statutory
language in this case, which prescribed limitations as well as powers, 95 reflects a concern for preserving the outcome of the legislative bargaining process. In his view, compromise "becomes impossible when there is no assurance that the statutory words in which
it is contained will be honored." Those representatives who unsuccessfully oppose a piece of legislation would "have every reason to
fear that any [statutory] ambiguity will be interpreted against
their interests" in subsequent litigation.' If, as Justice Scalia's administrative law cases suggest, the courts should defer to representative institutions in confronting difficult redistributive questions,
then courts also must take care to preserve the techniques of compromise that make legislative solutions possible.
To be sure, political compromises are not always easy to idenin Gott in part by reference to a brief passage in the House report expressing concern over
possible judicial review of individual benefit determinations. 756 F.2d at 909. He used the
passage, however, merely to refute the plaintiffs' own reference to the same materials in
support of jurisdiction.
90 749 F.2d 875, 887-93 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11917 (1982).
92

Id. § 10505(a).

, Illinois Commerce Com'n, 749 F.2d at 883-85.
.4 Id. at 888, 889.
"I Justice Scalia's reliance on statutory language will not always yield results that reduce judicial interference with agency functions. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v.
I.R.S., 792 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding, in a Freedom of Information Act case imposing a new requirement, that IRS "reformulate" tax return information before disclosure to
public, and that agency could not merely delete identifying names and numbers).
"' Illinois Commerce Com'n, 749 F.2d at 893 (dissent).
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tify. The language and history of statutes are often convoluted,
contradictory, or hopelessly ambiguous. In such cases, a judge of
necessity must engage in some degree of creativity and imaginative
reconstruction.9 7 The value of Justice Scalia's approach lies in its
willingness to acknowledge this problem rather than to seek refuge
in convenient answers gleaned from dubious external sources, such
as committee reports, that may not reflect the actual bargaining
process in the legislature.
Justice Scalia's approach could prove troublesome, however, in
at least three respects. First, in practical terms, courts often lack
the resources and political insight necessary to "dig behind the
scenes to find out the 'real' story."9 8 Indeed, there may be little
difference between the evidence that judges currently examine to
discern "legislative intent" and the evidence available to uncover
political negotiations. Second, the actual scope of compromise between legislators may go beyond the terms of a single statute. Typically, "logrolling" 9 9 occurs across different pieces of legislation; a
representative might trade her vote for railroad deregulation in exchange for a new post office in her home district. A judge truly
concerned with reconstructing the bargaining process in Congress
thus might have to look far beyond the statute at issue in a given
case. Further, it is far from clear how such information could be
used: it is difficult to imagine interpreting a railroad rate statute so
as to ensure the opposing representative gets her post office.
Third, while the bargain in Illinois Commerce Com'n involved
issues of federalism, the administrative law cases discussed in part
I suggest that legislation frequently involves the funneling of benefits to a particular interest group. An approach directing judges to
ferret out the lines of political bargaining might lead "not only to
more special interest legislation, but also to legislation that is less
honest as to its special interest antecedents."' 10 0 An interest group
would have little incentive to incur the political costs of obtaining
explicit pork-barrel legislation if it could obtain the same benefits
through laws couched in public-minded rhetoric. Justice Scalia
might respond that such broad language would bind a judge no less

97 The phrase "imaginative reconstruction" comes from Posner, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. at
817 (cited in note 67). As Judge Posner notes, this view has substantial roots in American
jurisprudence, particularly in the writings of Judge Learned Hand. Id. at 817 n.60.
"a Macey, 86 Colum. L. Rev. at 239 (cited in note 30). For similar criticism, see Richard
A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 263, 272-73 (1982).
:9 See John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions 99-101 (2d ed. 1981).
'00 Macey, 86 Colum. L. Rev. at 238 (cited in note 30).
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than would provisions explicitly allocating special benefits. Such
an admission, however, would seriously undercut his arguments for
denying standing in the face of broad statutory declarations, as
discussed in Part I.
The primary appeal of Justice Scalia's approach to statutory
interpretation-accepting or rejecting particular tools based on
whether they help reveal the dynamics of decision making by
elected officials-lies in its goals of constraining judicial discretion
and adhering to the legislature's design. Outside of cases where legislation displays clear political lines, however, this approach could
be at least as indeterminate as the tools (canons and committee
reports) that it purports to discard.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
JUDICIAL GUARDIANSHIP OF

PUBLIC DEBATE

The problems of interpreting delphic statutory language arise
on a broader scale in the area of constitutional rights. Like an
amorphous statute, the Constitution often speaks in general language to which a judge must attribute meaning in specific cases.
The first amendment, for instance, declares that "Congress shall
make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."
While historical research can flush out enduring values, traditions,
and understandings, changes in social conditions over time may
cast doubt on historical constitutional standards. Section A of this
part examines these problems of constitutional interpretation as illustrated in Justice Scalia's opinions dealing with freedom of the
press. Section B examines the conflict between political dissent
and the regulatory powers of government.
A.

Judicial Innovation and Freedom of the Press

1. The role of history in the articulation of constitutional
rights. The free press guarantee of the first amendment can be understood as a structural provision designed in part to protect "a
fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check
on the three official branches." 10 1 This conception is consistent
with Justice Scalia's institution-based jurisprudence, particularly
his affection for the separation of powers. Yet protection for the
press presents a conflict between institutions, pitting the press
against the regulatory powers of government. Thus, despite the institutional nature of the free press guarantee, Justice Scalia has
101Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 Hastings L. J. 631, 634 (1975).
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not been one of its strong defenders.
Justice Scalia's reluctance to favor the press over the government is demonstrated by In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press.10 2 In that case an organized reporters' group sought access to sealed discovery documents pertaining to a libel action by a
corporate officer against the Washington Post.10 3 The reporters asserted a first amendment right of prejudgment access to court
records in civil trials.
In reviewing this claim, Justice Scalia confined his inquiry to
whether the historical practice allowed such access and to whether
a right of access was essential to safeguard "the proper functioning
of the judicial process and the government as a whole." 10 Such an
inquiry appears simply to restate the two criteria used by the Supreme Court in previous press access cases.10 5 Justice Scalia, however, asserted that both the historical and functional questions
"must be answered affirmatively before a constitutional requirement of access can be imposed." In effect, the functional inquiry
would become relevant only to assure that "the most trivial and
unimportant historical practices" would not be "chiselled in consti10
'
tutional stone. 6
Strictly speaking, this approach is reconcilable with Supreme
Court precedent. In its decisions on press access rights, the Court
has left open the precise relationship between its historical and
functional inquiries. Faced with this ambiguity in the relevant authorities, Justice Scalia adopted an approach that would constrain
judges' ability to infer new first amendment rights. By contrast,
102
103

773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
The Mobil Oil Corporation had obtained a protective order based on an affidavit

that the documents contained sensitive business information. Once the trial ended, however,
Mobil "conceded the non-confidentiality of all but a handful of its documents" and ultimately "was unable to sustain its claim of confidentiality for a single document." Id. at 1344
(Wright, dissenting).
104

Id. at 1331.

85 See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 505-10 (1984)
(upholding press and public's right of access to voir dire examinations in criminal trials);
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604-07 (1982) (upholding press and
public's right of access to trial of defendant charged with rape of minor girls). In Richmond

Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the earliest of this line of cases, the Court
inferred a first amendment right for the press and the public to attend criminal trials. In a
plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger looked to the historical practice of open trials, id. at
564-73, and to the usefulness of a right of access in safeguarding the right "to speak and to
publish concerning what takes place at a trial," id. at 576-77. Similarly, Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion examined long-standing traditions, id. at 589-93, but also looked to the
function of access in "maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice," id. at
595.
10.

Reporters Comm., 773 F.2d at 1332, 1332.
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Judge Wright in dissent read the same body of precedent to show
that the Supreme Court merely "weighed historical practice as one
07
factor among many.'1
Justice Scalia supported his restrictive reading by referring to
institutional considerations: if a court's inquiry in constitutional
cases were to proceed "[w]ith neither the constraint of text nor the
constraint of historical practice, nothing would separate the judicial task of constitutional interpretation from the political task of
enacting laws currently deemed essential."' 0 8 Justice Scalia therefore denied the reporters' first amendment access claim because he
could not "discern an historic practice of such clarity, generality
and duration as to justify the pronouncement of a constitutional
rule" granting prejudgment access to records of private civil
actions. 0 9
The use of historical constraints in Reporters Comm. reflects a
belief that the unelected judiciary should hesitate before discovering new constitutional rights that enjoy heightened protection
from the normal political process. The undoing of such a newly
declared right, by means of a constitutional amendment, would require an extraordinary combination of popular forces.1' 0 Justice
Scalia thus would prefer to enforce only those practices that have
already been accepted rather than seek to transform historical
practice through judicial decisions.
This conception of the judicial role notably overlooks Marbury
v. Madison's declaration that it is the "province and duty" of the
courts to say what the law is.' A long-accepted practice does not
necessarily make a constitutional practice, and the absence of a
practice does not mean that that practice is not constitutionally
required. Only judges, not societal inertia, have the power to define
what the Constitution requires.
2. The problem of changed circumstances. While a free press
serves as an important external check on government conduct, its
power to criticize also may result in harm to individuals, whether
government officials or private citizens. As the Supreme Court has
noted, the individual's right "to the protection of his own good
name" is "'a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered

107 Id. at 1347.
208 Id. at 1332.
209 Id. at 1336 (original emphasis). For a reading of the common law tradition to support the right of access, see id. at 1348-51 (Wright, dissenting).
120 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust A Theory of Judicial Review 4 (1980).
12 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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liberty.' "112 Elaborating on this concern in its 1974 decision in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court observed that while "there
is no such thing as a false idea" under the first amendment, nonetheless there "is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.
. . . Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially
advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open'
debate on public issues."11 3 Although this remark represented a digression in Gertz itself, " ' a majority of the federal courts of appeals, including the D.C. Circuit, have accepted as controlling law
this distinction 5between protected opinions and unprotected state11
ments of fact.
In Olman v. Evans, for example, a Marxist political science
professor brought a defamation action against the authors of a
newspaper column that had criticized him for using his position to
impart Marxist revolutionary philosophy to his students. Specifically, the column had quoted an unidentified political scientist as
saying that the plaintiff had "no status" within his profession and
was merely "a pure and simple activist."""6 In a six-to-five vote, the
D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, held that this quoted statement was
absolutely protected as an expression of opinion under the first
amendment. Rather than joining the court's opinion, four of the
six judges voting to uphold the first amendment defense signed
Judge Bork's concurrence. Accordingly, Justice Scalia directed his
dissenting remarks to that opinion.
Judge Bork initially conceded that if the case presented only a
choice between protected opinions and unprotected statements of
fact, the challenged passage probably would fall in the unprotected
category, since it was "a statement that others hold a particular
opinion" about Ollman's professional status. Judge Bork noted,
however, that "life will bring up cases whose facts simply cannot
be handled [adequately] by purely verbal formulas." In particular,
a judge "who refuses to see new threats to an established constitu-

12

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974), quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer,

383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, concurring).
11 418 U.S. at 339-40, quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964).
114 The main part of the opinion dealt with whether the "actual malice" standard of
proof of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan should be extended to non-public figures. 418 U.S.
at 342-48.
15 See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974-75 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) and cases cited
therein.
116 Ollman, 750 F.2d at 973, quoting "The Marxist Professor's Intentions," a piece by
syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak in the May 4, 1978, edition of the
Washington Post.
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fails in his judicial duty."'1 1 Believing that a "re-

markable upsurge" in libel actions and damage awards threatened
"to impose [a form of] a self-censorship on the press,"'"" Judge
Bork substituted a test that considered "the totality of circumstances" in place of the formal pigeonholes of fact and opinion.""9
Because Ollman had gone beyond "the role of the cloistered
scholar" by using his academic post to further his political views,
Judge Bork reasoned that Ollman had exposed himself to the rhetoric of political discussion. 12 0
Justice Scalia, in dissent, took a markedly different approach:
he supported continued adherence to a flat rule of liability for the
knowingly false disparagement of a public figure's professional reputation. Justice Scalia stressed the "risk of judicial subjectivity" in
Judge Bork's test, which offered "no mechanism to gauge how
much defamation is a decent amount" in a given situation.'12
Justice Scalia also distinguished the "application of existing
[legal] principles to new [factual] phenomena" from the alteration
of the principles themselves based on a "judicial perception of
changed social circumstances.' ' 22 For Justice Scalia, the democratic structure of government requires judges to avoid the task of
constitutional innovation:
[T]he identification of 'modern problems' to be remedied is
quintessentially legislative rather than judicial business-largely because it is such a subjective judgment; . . .
remedies are to be sought through democratic change rather
than through judicial pronouncement that the Constitution
now prohibits what it did not prohibit before. . . . [I]t is
frightening to think that the existence or nonexistence of a
117 Id. at 994, 994, 996 (concurrence).
118 Id. at 996, citing Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time

to Return to "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 Colum. L. Rev. 603
(1983). While Lewis's article reviewed prominent libel decisions, it did not offer any quantitative evidence of the number or magnitude of libel awards.
119 750 F.2d at 997. Judge Bork went to great lengths to demonstrate that the Supreme
Court actually employed a balancing test rather than formalistic categories in its libel and

defamation cases. Id. at 998-1001. Justice Scalia viewed the same authorities as according
sufficient protection for the press, making further doctrinal evolution unnecessary. Id. at
1036-37 (dissent).
120 Id. at 1003 (Bork, concurring). This idea is not new. Gertz itself recognized that
erroneous statements of fact are "inevitable in free debate" and that therefore the first
amendment requires protection of "some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters."

418 U.S. at 340, 341.
121 750 F.2d at 1038.
122 Id. at 1038 n.2.
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constitutional rule . . . is to depend upon [judges'] ongoing
personal assessments of such sociological factors.12
As in the administrative law cases on standing, institutional considerations favoring judicial abstention dominated Justice Scalia's
conception of the private dispute in Ollman.
Unfortunately, the choice between placing a statement in the
category of fact or opinion appears equally fraught with uncertainty, particularly in a case like Ollman, where the contested
statement contained an assertion of fact that itself involved an
opinion. Application of formal labels in such a case masks the
judge's inevitable balancing of contextual evidence. Moreover, the
assertion that legal principles do not change when "applied" to
new circumstances is open to question. The critical legal studies
movement, for instance, has underscored the artificiality of judges'
claims that they "neutrally" apply existing principles laid down in
124
prior cases.
Finally, while emphasis on institutional concerns and separation of powers may be appropriate in resolving issues of justiciability, the resolution of constitutional issues calls for a diminished emphasis on institutional concerns. The substantive rules
governing libel actions are themselves the products of adjudication.
As Judge Bork tellingly observed, most first amendment doctrine
"is merely the judge-made superstructure that implements basic
constitutional principles. 1 25 Even the constitutional distinction
between protection granted to statements of opinion and that
granted to statements of fact had its genesis in the judicial process;
modification of that standard by judges thus would not infringe
upon any preexisting legislative domain. In fact, deference to a hypothetical legislative resolution at some undetermined future date
26
amounts to abandonment of judicial interpretation altogether.
Nor does deference to the representative process solve
problems of subjectivity. While Justice Scalia's approach would indeed transfer the "identification of modern problems" to the legislature, the choice to abstain from a judicial solution in itself re123

Id. at 1038-39 (original emphasis).

124 For

example, see Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of

Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 814-15 (1983).
125 750 F.2d at 995 (concurrence).
126Indeed, it is questionable whether Justice Scalia's jurisprudence would have permitted the Court to reach the same decision in New York Times, 376 U.S. 254, which imposed
constitutional limits on the states' power (recognized by a long record of history) to award
libel damages in the absence of actual malice, in part due to the deterrent effect of such
awards on the exercise of speech rights.
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flects a conception of legitimate power in a representative
government. Justice Scalia probably would maintain that such underlying values stem from constitutional structure rather than subjective considerations. As his exchange with Judge Bork indicates,
however, there may not be agreement-even among proponents of
"judicial restraint"127 -as to the principles that should govern judicial consideration of new circumstances. Moreover, as Justice
Scalia himself recognized in criticizing legislative vetoes, 128 Congress may not be able to, or even wish to, turn to these problems. A
choice of no judicial decision may foreseeably be a choice of no
government decision at all.
Despite these objections, Justice Scalia's approach in Olman
retains considerable merit. The external forces identified by Judge
Bork were of recent origin: the purported "upsurge in libel actions" took place in the two decades since the Supreme Court's
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 2 9 The historical considerations set forth by Justice Scalia in Reporters Comm. thus
may lend support to his deferential posture in Olman: to expand
constitutional rights because of short-run phenomena would be unwise, given that such expansion is not easily rolled back. Furthermore, there are reasons to think that the representative process
will be receptive to the free expression claims at stake in Reporters
Comm. and Olman. As Justice Scalia wryly noted, "[i]t has not
often been thought. . . that the press is among the least effective
of legislative lobbyists."1 3 0
Justice Scalia's approach also may be based on a desire to preserve discussion of constitutional values by the other branches.
127 For background on Judge Bork's views as an academic on judicial restraint in first
amendment cases, see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1 (1971). Despite its age, Judge Bork's article remains a frequently
cited description of judicial restraint. For a more recent, but also more general, exposition,
see Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent and Economic Rights, 23 San Diego
L. Rev. 823 (1986).
128 See note 56 and accompanying text.
129 Lewis, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 603 (cited in note 118), covered developments since New
York Times. For arguments that the instability in libel actions since New York Times instead indicates the fundamental unsoundness of that decision, see Richard A. Epstein, Was
New York Times Wrong?, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 782 (1986).
230 Ollman, 750 F.2d at 1039 (dissent). This argument may well turn the free press
clause on its head; a conventional "structural" conception of the press clause as protecting a
fourth center of power outside of government favors special judicial solicitude for press
claims, see Stewart, 26 Hastings L. J. at 633 (cited in note 101).
But consider also Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 Hastings L. J. 639, 639 (1975) (separate clause may indicate less protection for press).
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While much of what legislatures do may consist of pure power
politics, a judge should not foreclose opportunities for politicians
and their constituents to interpret the Constitution for themselves.
As Professor Thayer observed, judicial review carries a tendency
"to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its
sense of moral responsibility," because the people thereby lose the
experience and education that come from reassessment of their basic principles.1 31
At its root, Justice Scalia's view embodies a deep suspicion of
the judiciary's ability to sustain constitutional values on its own.
Commenting on the relationship between Congress and the courts,
Justice Scalia has observed:
[C]ongressionally applied constitutional law ultimately affects
the character of the judicially applied stratum beneath it.
This may or may not be desirable but it is unquestionably
true.. . . When our people ceased to believe in a federal government of narrowly limited [economic and regulatory] powers, Congress's constitutional interpretation disregarded such
1 32
limitations, and the courts soon followed.
This understanding of representative government shuns the transformative power of law-that is, the potential for judicial decisions
to shape the beliefs of the people. Those who believe in such transformative functions of law concede that the courts must select a
normative theory before they may transform attitudes. 33 For Justice Scalia, democratic principles would foreclose any such aspiration on the part of an insulated judiciary.
B. Freedom of Speech and the Power to Govern
In cases involving standing issues, Justice Scalia deferred to
the representative process for resolution of broad political objections to government policy. While the electoral process established
by the Constitution formally safeguards this interest, the first
amendment's free speech clause facilitates representative government in a less structured way. The first amendment thus forces
Justice Scalia to confront the tension between his deference to the
regulatory powers of goverment and his special solicitude for the
"1

note 9).
1"2
133

James Thayer, John Marshall 106 (1901), quoted in Stone Casebook at 33 (cited in
Scalia, 3 Regulation at 20 (cited in note 56).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L.

Rev. 1129, 1169-70 (1986).
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rights of political minorities.
Justice Scalia has tended to resolve this conflict in favor of
regulatory interests. An example is Block v. Meese,"3 ' where the
United States distributor and prospective United States exhibitors
of three Canadian documentary films criticizing American policy
on acid rain challenged the Justice Department's classification of
the films as "political propaganda" under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).1 3 5 The plaintiffs claimed that the term
"propaganda" amounted to a pronouncement by the United States
government that the films contained "misstatements, half-truths
and attempts to mislead."13 6 In upholding the classification for a
unanimous panel, Justice Scalia gave the government substantial
latitude for participation in political debate. Initially, he maintained that the classification did not entail government disapproval at all. Rather, "in labelling something 'propaganda' the government is not expressing its own disapproval but is merely
identifying an objective category of speech of which the public gen1' 7
erally disapproves. One problem with this approach lies in its suggestion that the
process of categorization can remain impartial where the objective
label "propaganda" is inextricably associated with connotations of
untruth. In response to this problem, Justice Scalia observed that
the Justice Department had attached the label "propaganda" to
other foreign films advocating positions supported by the United
States: for instance, films criticizing the Berlin Wall and detailing
the plight of Soviet Jews." 8 Such applications reduced suspicion
that the Justice Department had used FARA as a ruse for content
regulation.
Although Justice Scalia might have resolved Block on this narrow ground specific to FARA, he went on to suggest a connection
between standards for government participation in political debate
and standards for government regulation: "If the first amendment

793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd as Meese v. Keene, 107 S.Ct. 1862 (1987).
22 U.S.C. §§ 611-22 (1982). FARA defined "political propaganda" to include communication "'reasonably adapted to... prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in
any other way influence a recipient or any section of the public ... with reference to the
political or public interests, policies, or relations' of a foreign government or political party
or the foreign policy of the United States." Block, 793 F.2d at 1311, quoting 22 U.S.C.
§ 611(0). Block also upheld application of a Justice Department regulation, enacted pursuant
to FARA, requiring that foreign agents disclose the name of each exhibitor using their films.
793 F.2d at 1315-18.
136 793 F.2d at 1311, quoting Brief for Appellants at 54.
137 793 F.2d at 1312.
238Id.
134
.35
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considers speakers to be so timid, or important ideas to be so fragile, that they are overwhelmed by knowledge of governmental disagreement, then it is hard to understand why official government
action, which speaks infinitely louder than words, does not constantly disrupt the first amendment 'marketplace.' "M39
Justice Scalia's comparison, however, fails to recognize that
while regulatory action may reflect a government viewpoint, it usually has another legitimate purpose, such as preventing harm. Naked government disapproval of speech, on the other hand, has only
an illegitimate purpose: to regulate thoughts and ideas. On this
point, Justice Scalia merely offered practical arguments based on
the judiciary's inability to draw the requisite lines. In his view,
"[i]t would constantly be necessary to decide when the government
has crossed the line between mere fact-finding (which presumably
140
remains constitutional) and ideological advocacy.'

Justice Scalia's opinion in Block appears at odds with his own
conception of the judiciary as the protector of political minorities.
If a judge accepts the proposition that the Constitution leaves "the
selection and accomodation of substantive values . . . almost entirely to the political process,' 4' she should exercise special care to

safeguard the operation of that process, particularly the participatory rights of minorities. The first amendment recognizes
that the democratic process depends not only on the formal means
of representation in government, but also on the self-help mechanisms of free expression. 4 2 When a judge simply throws up her
hands at the prospect of difficult line drawing in a first amendment
case, she permits the majority to defeat the rights of the minority
in that case and distorts the process by which new majorities will
form in the future.
To be sure, a lenient standard for government participation in
public debate may be desirable in that it could increase the range
of ideas available in the "marketplace." The troublesome point of
Block is its willingness to resolve that question implicitly as part of
a practical discussion, rather than through an explicit (though
more difficult) weighing of constitutional values. In this sense,
Block reflects Olman's distrust of the judiciary's ability to perform such a balance.
Id. at 1313 (original emphasis).
14

Id. Paradoxically, this objection would undercut the judicially drawn line between

opinion and fact, advocated by Justice Scalia in Oilman.
141 Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 87 (cited in note 110).
142 See generally id. at 105-16.
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Justice Scalia's preference for the government over dissenters
14 3
also appears in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt.
There, the National Park Service had permitted the Community
for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) to construct symbolic tent cities in Washington, D.C. as part of a round-the-clock dramatization
of the plight of the homeless. The Park Service prohibited the
demonstrators from sleeping overnight in the tents, invoking a regulation banning "camping" in the parks.144 CCNV thus presented
the issue of government regulation of expressive conduct. In a sixto-five en banc decision, the D.C. Circuit held that the camping
regulation was unconstitutional as applied to CCNV. In his majority opinion, Judge Mikva had no difficulty concluding that the proposed sleeping constituted protected expression where it was
"carefully designed to . . . express the demonstrators' [political]
'145
message."
Faced with a situation in which "'speech' and 'non-speech' elements [were] combined in the same course of conduct, 1 46 the majority employed the four-factor balancing test set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien.4 7 In evaluating the
substantiality of the government's regulatory interest under the
O'Brien framework, the majority looked solely at the marginal
benefits to be derived from regulation of CCNV's particular conduct. It reasoned that where CCNV had already been allowed to
"maintain an all-night presence," there would be "no incremental
savings of
park resources . . . to be gained by proscribing only
1 48
sleep."
In contrast, the principal dissent, authored by Judge Wilkey
and joined by Justice Scalia, reasoned that the court should not
look solely to the governmental interest in preventing CCNV alone
from sleeping, but rather should consider "the interest in prevent-

"' 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983) reversed by Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
144 36 C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (1982), quoted in CCNV,703 F.2d at 588 n.1.
145 CCNV, 703 F.2d at 592.
146 Id. at 595, quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
147 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding statute prohibiting knowing destruction of draft
cards as applied to demonstrator who burned his card to protest Vietnam conflict). In
O'Brien, the Court held that regulation of symbolic conduct is constitutionally permissible
"if [1] it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if [2] it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if [3] the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if [4] the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id.
at 377.
148 CCNV, 703 F.2d at 596 (emphasis added).
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ing camping by all classes of persons, whatever their motive."1 9
This perspective, permitting all future beneficial applications of a
general rule to enter the constitutional calculus, severely limits
protection of dissenters from majoritarian interests. Indeed, it also
strongly resembles the model of rulemaking (based on legislative
function) rather than adjudication (predicated on the judicial
model),1 50 and contrasts with Justice Scalia's antipathy to
rulemaking by courts in administrative law cases.
CCNV's debate over the proper evaluation of governmental interests largely suppressed a second issue in the case. While adopting Judge Wilkey's reasoning on review, the Supreme Court assumed but did not decide that CCNV's sleeping was expressive
conduct protected by the first amendment. 151 It was this question,
however, that had stirred the pen of Justice Scalia in the D.C. Circuit below.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia set forth a view
of free expression that would restrict the category of behavior to be
accorded full first amendment protection and expand the permissible scope of content-neutral regulation. Under Justice Scalia's literal reading, the speech and press clauses afford "special protection against all laws that impinge upon spoken or written
communication," but they do not "extend equivalent protection
against laws that affect actions which happen to be conducted for
the purpose of 'making a point.' ",152 This reflects a fear that if behavior were to receive full first amendment protection simply because of a remote possibility that the behavior might have been
used to "make a point," the regulatory power of government would
be paralyzed.
As in Block v. Meese, Justice Scalia relied on a remote possibility to support abstention from judicial line drawing. Consideration of extreme scenarios certainly can aid judicial decision mak14,Id. at 616 (dissent). Because "the vast majority" of persons wishing to camp in
Washington parks "would not be intending to express anything," id. at 618, the incidental
infringement on speech was minimal compared to the government's regulatory interest in
providing clean and orderly parks for non-campers.
This reasoning prevailed in the Supreme Court in Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). The critical passage in Justice White's opinion is virtually identical to the language used by Judge Wilkey. Id. at 296-97. For a similar understanding of CCNV, see Easterbrook, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 19-21 (cited in note 27).
IgoFor general background on the significance of this distinction in administrative law,
see Stephen G. Breyer and Richard B. Stewart, Adminstrative Law and Regulatory Policy
466-75 (2d ed. 1985).
151 CCNV, 468 U.S. at 293.
152 CCNV, 703 F.2d at 622, 622 (dissent) (original emphasis).
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ing. The problem in both Block and CCNV, however, is that
Justice Scalia expressly considered only one of at least two extreme
scenarios. Full first amendment protection for all forms of conduct
would indeed paralyze the regulatory powers of government. But a
lack of protection for symbolic conduct, such as sit-ins and picketing, would foreclose crucial methods of political expression that arguably are especially important for those holding dissident views.
And while (as Justice Scalia argued in Block) a total prohibition on
governmental disapproval of speech may harm the government's
ability to regulate actions, blanket protection of such disapproval
would enable government to exploit its political market power and
thereby inhibit effective advancement of alternative views.
CCNV also shows that although Justice Scalia is not willing to
extend the constitutional shield to individual acts not historically
practiced, he is willing to depart from legal doctrine to extend that
shield to governmental acts. His dissent indicates that he will look
beyond or reinterpret the formal tests set forth in Supreme Court
precedent in order to safeguard the regulatory powers of government. As the majority in CCNV observed, in concluding that the
Park Service's conduct was constitutional, Justice Scalia effectively
"collapse[d] the four-pronged O'Brien test into a one-pronged
153
standard" of content neutrality.
Thus, while the opinions involving constitutional protections
for the press resist creative judicial interpretation of the first
amendment, other cases demonstrate the powerful influence that
Justice Scalia's guardianship of government power can exert on his
willingness to reformulate substantive doctrine. Although there remains room in his conception of public debate for expressions of
dissent, such inputs to the representative process cannot subsume
the outputs of that process as embodied in the rules by which a
democratic majority exercises its legitimate power to govern.
CONCLUSION

Though frequently set forth in "conservative" terms, Justice
Scalia's jurisprudence in administrative and first amendment law
calls for substantial change in existing legal doctrines. The impetus for this change stems from his tendency to view the substantive issues in a given case through the prism of the institutional
constraints on courts within the scheme of representative
government.

153

Id. at 600 n.36.
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For Justice Scalia, the Constitution does not give a mandate to
the judiciary to ensure perfect government. That responsibility
rests with the formal mechanisms of the representative process. As
his tenure on the Supreme Court begins, Justice Scalia stands as a
lawyer skeptical of the transformative power of law, a jurist uneasy
with judicial authority.
Richard Nagareda

